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Creating Chaos In The Name Of
Consistency: Affirmative Action And
The Odd Legacy Of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Frank S. Ravitch*
Introduction
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' is a strange decision.
Civil rights advocates will likely express outrage at the inconsis-
tencies in logic and disregard for historical context that resonate
throughout the majority opinion, concerns addressed by Justice
Stevens in his poignant dissent.2 Over time, however, Adarand
could become more problematic for those who support its reason-
ing and result than for civil rights advocates. For in its attempt to
create clarity, Adarand has instead created anomalies within the
tiered equal protection framework regarding both invidious
discrimination and benign measures that benefit protected classes.
This article explores the anomalies created when the conceptual
framework developed in Adarand is considered in light of affirma-
tive action based on gender and disability. In addition, this article
addresses the options that Adarand has left us in this regard.
However, the Adarand decision is not solely responsible for
creating this odd state of affairs. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co.' also contributed to the conceptual framework and set the
stage for the anomalies discussed in this article.
* Assistant Professor and Legal Studies Coordinator, University of Central Florida
Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies. This article was originally presented as
a paper at the 50th Annual Conference of the New York State Political Science Association
in Ithaca, NY on March 30, 1996. I would like to thank Oren Zeve, James Wooten, Marcus
Dubber, Michael Meurer, Steven Halpem and Susan Behuniak for their valuable insights and
support. I would also like to thank Charles Abernathy and Gary Gildin for their continued
support and inspiration.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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The primary focus of this article is neither the inconsistencies
presented by the Adarand decision,4 nor the fact that the opinion
views benign race based measures in a completely ahistorical and
decontextualized fashion.' Rather, this article looks at a potential-
ly bigger concern arising from the Adarand Court's quest for
consistency. In the wake of Adarand and Croson different
standards would seem applicable to benign measures based on
race,6 gender7 and disability.' This difference in standards is
likely to cause a great deal of confusion since these three classes
4. However, these inconsistencies, particularly the Majority's failure to see the
dichotomy between Congressional action enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and state
action subject to it to the extent they are relevant to this article, will be discussed infra Parts
I and II.D. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out this
problem); Leading Cases: Affirmative Action-Federal Minority Preference Programs, 109
HARV. L. REV. 111, 156-57 (1995).
5. This same criticism has been eloquently discussed in regard to Croson. See Michel
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond- Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Consti-
tutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1989). It could be said that Adarand simply took
the ahistorical, decontextualized approach utilized in Croson and applied it to Congressional
action as well.
6. Pursuant to Adarand and Croson, strict scrutiny is applicable to benign racial
measures. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
7. Since Croson, many of the courts which have considered gender and race based
programs have applied strict scrutiny to race while applying intermediate scrutiny to gender.
See Concrete Works of Colorado v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying strict scrutiny to racial aspects of program and intermediate scrutiny to
gender aspects); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on
remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cit. 1996); Coral Const. Co.
v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken,
834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), affid mem., 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (pre-Croson case coming to
the same conclusion); Associated Gen. Contr. of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Peter Lurie, Comment, The Law as They Found It:
Disentangling Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs From Croson, 59 U. CI. L. REV.
1563 (1992) (specifically arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate mode of
analysis for equal protection challenges to gender based programs after Croson); Cf Cone
Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying strict scrutiny to both
gender and racial classifications, but reversing trial court's grant of summary judgement
invalidating the law); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to gender and racial classifications); American Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of
Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989). Significantly, the cases that have applied strict scrutiny to
benign gender based programs do not explain why they do so. See Lurie, supra at 1582-83.
However, courts which have looked at this issue in depth have generally applied intermediate
scrutiny to gender classifications. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990; Coral Construction, 941
F.2d 910; Michigan Road Builders, 834 F.2d 583; Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d 922.
8. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (applying strict scrutiny to race, intermediate
scrutiny to gender and rational basis to disability related aspects of a Philadelphia ordinance
which provided for set-asides).
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are often the focus of the same kinds of affirmative action
programs.9
Significantly, several courts have already had to deal with
programs that address both gender and race since Croson.10
These courts have not agreed on how to apply Croson in deter-
mining the appropriate standard for gender based programs."
Adding consideration of disability to this mix only increases the
confusion. These concerns can lead to odd results, especially in
light of this country's history of discrimination. 2
This article proposes that Adarand essentially leaves four
mutually exclusive options in regard to this situation. First,
depending upon the class involved, three different standards would
apply to benign programs. These three standards would make it
harder to enact benign race based programs than programs based
on gender, and harder still to enact benign gender based programs
than those based on disability. This first option creates what I call
a vertical anomaly, and it is this troubling anomaly Adarand seems
to have wrought.13
Second, all benign measures based on any protected classifica-
tion would receive strict scrutiny while leaving the current three
tiered scheme in place in all other situations. This option would
make it easier to enact laws that invidiously discriminate based on
gender or disability than to enact laws which attempt to remedy the
current effects of past discrimination against those classes. This
second option, while solving the vertical anomaly created by option
number one, creates what I term a horizontal anomaly. 4
The third option would require all gender, disability and race
based measures to receive strict scrutiny in regard to equal protec-
9. Id.
10. See supra note 7 (listing cases which have dealt with both race-based and gender-
based programs).
11. Id.
12. For example, in Associated GerL Contr., 813 F.2d 922, the court, using a strict
scrutiny analysis, found the race based aspects of an affirmative action program designed to
increase minority and female participation in city contracting unconstitutional. However, the
gender based aspects of the program were found to be constitutional under the intermediate
scrutiny test. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
anomalous result created by the application of strict scrutiny to benign race based measures
in light of the differing levels of scrutiny applicable to other classes of individuals).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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tion challenges. 5 This option solves both the vertical and hori-
zontal anomalies. Given the current makeup of the Court,
however, and considering the concerns raised over giving gender
and disability suspect class status, this option may be difficult to
achieve.'6
The fourth, and perhaps best option, is to recognize that
Adarand was wrongly decided, and to apply a lower level of
scrutiny to benign measures aimed at remedying the current effects
of past discrimination. 7 How realistic this option actually is, is
difficult to ascertain given the current make up of the Court.
However, as will be discussed below," the Adarand majority
actually provides, in an attempt to justify its treatment of Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC,'9 the analytical framework which could be
used to overturn its own opinion. Of course, even if Adarand is
overturned, Croson would still remain. Thus, at least with regard
to state and local programs, the first three options would remain.'
Moreover, I assert in this article that even if strict scrutiny
were applied to benign class based measures, many such programs
can survive that scrutiny in light of the language used to describe
strict scrutiny in Adarand," and the cases applying similar lan-
15. This option has been proposed for gender and race in light of Croson. See John
Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny For Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1993). An
opposite proposal also exists. See Lurie, supra note 7 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny
is still applicable to gender claims after Croson). The reasoning and the rationale behind
each of these proposals differ.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. Another appealing possibility would be to take affirmative action programs subject
to constitutional standards out of the traditional three tiered analytical framework applied
in equal protection cases and apply a different standard to them. See infra Part II.D. See
also Holly Dyer, Comment, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in the Tiered
Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny? 41 KAN. L. REV. 591, 612-13 (1993) (suggesting that
Justice Stevens has already laid the groundwork for such a standard in his opinions which
often express distaste for the three tiered standards, and setting forth a test grounded in his
opinions).
18. See infra Part II.D.
19. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
20. The court might also overturn Croson. However, to the extent that the bases for
doing so are different than those for overturning Adarand, they are beyond the scope of this
article. Significantly, however, Adarand itself overturned the earlier precedent Metro
Broadcasting and at least aspects of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (these decisions were overturned to the extent they do not
comport with Adarand).
21. In Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117, the majority asserts:
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.' (citation omitted). The unhappy persistence of both the practical
[Vol. 101:2
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS 285
guage in Croson to affirmative action programs.' The real issue
lies in meeting the necessary evidentiary burden, and not in the
feasibility of such programs in general.' Thus, while Congress
and local governments may have to go to great expense to jump
through the evidentiary hoops that the Court now requires in order
to justify beneficial programs (which could actually be supported by
less costly yet quite probative evidence),24 such programs can
indeed survive strict scrutiny when the proper requirements are
met.
Part I of this article discusses the Adarand decision in light of
several earlier decisions considering the appropriate analytical
framework for constitutional challenges to affirmative action
programs. Part II addresses the four possible results of Adarand in
regard to the appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny for race,
gender and disability and suggests that the third and fourth options
mentioned above are the most appropriate possibilities.' This
Part also introduces the concepts of horizontal and vertical
and lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country
is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.
id.
22. Several cases utilizing the strict scrutiny test set forth in Croson have addressed the
circumstances under which state and local race based affirmative action programs can be
constitutional. See, e.g., Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1008
(holding that the city of Philadelphia presented sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgement in regard to race based program but ultimately affirming order on remand after
bench trial enjoining race based program under strict scrutiny standard); Cone Corp., 908
F.2d at 916 (holding that Hillsborough County presented sufficient evidence on the question
of prior discrimination and the need for racial classification to justify denial of summary
judgement).
23. After Croson, courts and commentators alike have agreed upon the importance of
meeting the necessary evidentiary burden. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001-09
(reversing order granting summary judgement against Philadelphia in regard to race based
aspects of set-aside program after engaging in an in-depth analysis of the evidence presented
by the city to justify the program in light of the evidentiary burden set forth in Croson);
Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 913-16 (stating that Croson did not preclude local governments from
enacting race based affirmative action programs, but rather established a "stringent burden
of proof for proponents of MBE laws to meet" and holding that the evidence presented by
the government entity involved was sufficient to withstand summary judgement). See also
Joint Statement Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989) ("The Supreme Court has
insisted that affirmative action programs be carefully designed-not dismantled.").
24. This observation will be discussed further. See infra Part III. Unfortunately the
ability to compile evidence to meet the evidentiary burden may not convince government
entities that it is worth the expense.
25. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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anomaly, asserting that one or the other will occur unless options
three or four are utilized. Part III draws a connection between
judicial scrutiny of state and local affirmative action programs after
Croson and the likely result in regard to federal programs after
Adarand. Finally, Part III, concludes that such programs can
indeed survive strict scrutiny as it is described in both Croson and
Adarand.
Ultimately, this article proposes that the most viable option is
to overturn Adarand; an option which the decision's own language,
as well as it's inconsistencies would strongly support. By overturn-
ing Adarand, the vertical and horizontal anomalies potentially
created by the Court's approach could be eliminated. The other
option this Article suggests as palatable would be to apply Adarand
to gender and disability based affirmative action programs, thus
subjecting invidious measures aimed at those classes to strict
scrutiny (which is generally fatal),26 while subjecting benign mea-
sures based on those classifications to a version of strict scrutiny
that might not be fatal if the enacting body can meet the necessary
evidentiary burden.27
I. The Adarand Decision
Before addressing the issues raised in Parts II and III of this
Article, it is essential to discuss the Adarand case itself and some
of the concerns caused by its reasoning. In Adarand, the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to a benign race based
program created by Congress.' Until Adarand, the Court had not
yet applied strict scrutiny to such a federal program. In fact, in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,29 the most recent decision to
address the issue at the time Adarand was decided, a majority of
the Court applied a more lenient standard to the benign race based
program promulgated by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.3°
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that intermediate
scrutiny applied to benign race based measures, and required that
26. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that after Adarand
strict scrutiny analysis of invidious discrimination is still likely to be fatal, while benign
measures can survive under proper circumstances).
27. Id. at 2117.
28. Id.
29. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
30. Id.
[Vol. 101:2
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such programs be substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective.31 Likewise, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,32 a case
decided ten years prior to Metro Broadcasting, a plurality of the
Justices had applied an amorphous, but potentially more lenient
standard than strict scrutiny,33 to a program very similar to the
one involved in Adarand.34
Between Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, the Court decided
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 35  Croson applied strict
scrutiny review to a benign race-based program enacted by a local
government, and ultimately found the program unconstitutional.36
However, Croson did not present a federal affirmative action
program; rather, the program attacked had been enacted by a local
government.37 Indeed, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
and Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion, both acknowledged that
Congress has a specific mandate to enforce the dictates of the
31. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
32. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
33. In Fullilove, the plurality did not directly apply any of the three levels of scrutiny
commonly used in equal protection analysis. Instead, the court looked to "whether the
objectives of the legislation are within the power of Congress" and to whether the use "of
racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for
achieving the Congressional objectives." Id. at 473 (emphasis in the original). Justice
Powell, in his concurrence, stated his belief that the plurality opinion was generally in accord
with his view that strict scrutiny should apply to racial classifications. Id. at 496 (Powell, J.,
concurring). However, the opinion has been interpreted to provide a more lenient standard
than strict scrutiny because a majority of the court in Fullilove did not apply strict scrutiny.
See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-66. See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472, 492; id. at
519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgement) (Marshall's concurrence, which applied
intermediate scrutiny to the program, was joined by two other Justices).
34. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448; but see id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that he
believed the opinion should have placed greater emphasis on the articulation of a standard
to review such claims, but despite that fact the plurality opinion was generally in accord with
his view that strict scrutiny should apply to all race based classifications). The Fullilove
plurality upheld a program that was strikingly similar to the one at issue in Adarand. In fact,
in his dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice Souter stated that Fulilove should have
controlled the constitutionality of the programs at question in Adarand, which seemed better
tailored than the programs at issue in Fullilove. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131-34 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter also seemed to question the wisdom of even considering the
scrutiny standard issue, since he understood the appropriate issue on appeal to be whether
a federal agency needs to make specific findings of discrimination before it could "exceed
the goals adopted by Congress in implementing a race-based remedial program." Id. at 2131.
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 491.
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Fourteenth Amendment, whereas state conduct is specifically
subject to that Amendment.38
This position is consistent with that presented by the Fullilove
plurality39 and the Metro Broadcasting majority4°-a fact not lost
on Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Adarand.4' It is
against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Adarand.
However, the Court inexplicably held in Adarand that Congres-
sional action aimed at remedying the effects of past discrimination
in the several states should be analyzed under the same standard
as state action, using strict scrutiny.42 To the extent that Metro
Broadcasting and Fullilove are inconsistent with Adarand, the
Supreme Court overruled those decisions.' 3
The Adarand majority, including Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
seemingly ignored their earlier position, providing no justification
beyond a new analytical approach which embraced the concepts of
38. In Croson, Justice O'Connor wrote:
Congress, unlike any state or political subdivision, has a specific consti-
tutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which
Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic
rules to deal with those situations. The Civil War Amendments themselves
worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state powers
over matters of race.
Id. at 490. Similarly, Justice Scalia wrote:
[I]t is one thing to permit racially based conduct by the Federal Govern-
ment-whose legislative powers concerning matters of race were explicitly
enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment, See U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 5-and
quite another to permit it by the precise entities against whose conduct in matters
of race that Amendment was specifically directed. See Amdt. 14, § 1.
Id. at 521-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472.
40. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
41. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2097.
43. Id. at 2113, 2117.
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS 289
skepticism, congruence and consistency.' The majority relies
heavily upon these three concepts in justifying its decision. "'
In short, as envisioned by the Adarand majority, skepticism
refers to the idea that race based preferences should receive a
44. Id.; I at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the practical implication
of this approach, see infra Part II.D. Justice O'Connor denies that this is a change of
position, stating:
It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of the
authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with
the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer
to Congress' exercise of that authority ... (citations omitted) ... We need not,
and do not, address these differences today. For now, it is enough to observe that
Justice Stevens' suggestion that any Member of this Court has repudiated his or
her previously expressed views on the subject, post, at 2123-2125, 2127, is
incorrect.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
However, it is hard to believe, given the language cited supra note 38, and the
language in Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, that Adarand does not represent a significant
change of position by several Justices and the Court as a whole. To say that an opinion
addressing the issue of the constitutionality of benign race-based measures created by the
federal government and enforceable in the states, need not address Congress' special power
to deal with racial issues and enforce the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is shocking.
It is possible the majority means to imply that deference to Congress in this regard
should be a factor considered in strict scrutiny analysis of such programs. However, this
would result in a tiered version of strict scrutiny, and Adarand will have doubly confused an
already confusing area of law. It would also be a hollow deference paid to Congress' special
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because any
concept of strict scrutiny does not seem to fit well with special deference to the Legislature.
45. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. These three concepts are grounded in the principle that
the promise of equal protection contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects
individuals, not groups. As Justice O'Connor writes:
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all derive from
the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
protect persons, not groups. It follows from that principle that all governmental
action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in "most circum-
stances irrelevant and therefore prohibited," Hirabayashi, supra at 100, 63 S. Ct.
at 1385-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed. These ideas
have long been central to this Court's understanding of equal protection, and
holding "benign" state and federal racial classification to different standards does
not square with them.
Id. at 2112-13 (emphasis added in the original). This method of reasoning leads the majority
directly to the conclusion that, in a free society based on the doctrine of equality, strict
scrutiny should apply to all race-based measures because government may treat people
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons. Id. Significantly,
however, the majority cites nothing in support of the idea that strict scrutiny is the only level
of scrutiny consistent with these principles in the context of benign measures created by
Congress in response to the effects of discrimination aimed at particular racial classifications.
Id.
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searching examination.' Consistency refers to the idea that the
standard to be applied to race based classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause should not depend on the race of those effected
by the classification.47 Congruence refers to the idea that equal
protection analysis of federal action under the Fifth Amendment
should be the same as that applied to state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.4
Essentially, the concepts of skepticism and consistency amount
to a "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" philosophy.
In other words, race based classifications should be viewed
skeptically and consistently regardless of whether it is the majority
or a minority which is burdened by the classification and regardless
of the historical context from which that classification arose. Under
this approach, if you cannot have a preference which favors the
majority, you cannot have one that favors the minority unless you
subject it to the same standard.49
Congruence is a similarly simplistic concept. If the states are
held to a particular standard under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of congruence requires
that the federal government be held to no less of a standard under
the Fifth Amendment."0 At first glance, this result seems to be
supported by simple logic. Any other result would suggest that the
federal government be able to discriminate more than the states.5'
But for the unfortunate fact that the majority's idea of congru-
ence ignores the difference between Congress' power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment and the states' role as subservient to that
Amendment," as well as some of the explanatory language of the
Justices themselves, 3 the Court's theory of congruence might be
a persuasive one. However, the majority fails to recognize the fact
that its opinion compares apples and oranges. Arguably Congress
should be no more able to perpetuate invidious discrimination than
a state would be,' but it cannot be ignored that, in passing benign
46. Id at 2111.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id- at 2111-13.
50. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
51. IM at 2113, 2115.
52. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
53. Id
54. Justice Stevens addresses this concern in his dissenting opinion, but explains why
there is no conflict with Congress' receiving greater deference than a state government when
[Vol. 101:2
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race based measures applicable to the states, Congress is acting to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; an act that Congress is
specifically empowered to perform.5
The majority accounts for this argument in part with the other
two principles- skepticism and consistency. The Court argues that
one cannot know whether a measure is truly invidious or benign
without subjecting it to the most exacting of scrutiny.5 6 Implicitly
then, when Congress passes an apparently remedial race-based
measure, one cannot know whether Congress is acting to discrimi-
nate or simply to enforce its power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Only by subjecting the measure to strict scrutiny, and thus
a higher evidentiary burden, can a determination be made as to the
validity of Congressional action.57
Of course application of these two principles creates an odd
situation: in order to determine whether remedial action by
it enacts a benign race-based program:
Presumably, the majority is now satisfied that its theory of "congruence"
between the substantive rights provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
disposes of the objection based on divided constitutional powers. But it is one
thing to say (as no one seems to dispute) that the Fifth Amendment encompasses
a general guarantee of equal protection as broad as that contained within the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is another thing entirely to say that Congress'
institutional competence and constitutional authority entitles it to no greater
deference when it enacts a program designed to foster equality than the deference
due a state legislature. The latter is an extraordinary proposition; and, as the
foregoing discussion demonstrates, our precedents have rejected it explicitly and
repeatedly.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. Justice Stevens writes a few pages later
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same time
it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It represents our Nation's
consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry history of race
relations, that the Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial
minorities against the States, some of which may be inclined to oppress such
minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ignores a purposeful "incongruity" so
fundamental to our system of government is unacceptable.
In my judgement, the Court's novel doctrine of "congruence" is seriously
misguided. Congressional deliberations about a matter as important as affirmative
action should be accorded far greater deference than those of a State or munici-
pality.
Id. at 2126 (footnotes omitted). Significantly, if the basis for the court's approach is the lack
of clarity regarding whether Congress is acting pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments when it passes benign measures applicable in the states, context would seem to
provide an answer. Of course, if this were really the issue, Congress could simply state in
the legislation that it is acting pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
56. Id. at 2113-14.
57. 1d.
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Congress is proper it must be subject to the same strict scrutiny
standard as the invidious discrimination that it was meant to
remedy. Thus, Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment is treated the same as state action subject to that
amendment and Congress' own duty not to violate the Fifth
Amendment.8
Congruence aside,59 the other two concepts appear, at least
at first glance, to make sense. After all, why should one or two
racial groups have an advantage in an equal, color-blind society?
The simple answer is that our society is neither equal nor color-
blind.' Beyond that reality, however, to treat legislation aimed
at remedying the effects of past or present discrimination directed
at racial minorities and legislation meant to discriminate against
those minorities as the same, one must completely divorce the
legislation from its historical context and turn the debate into an
ahistorical analysis of racial categorization.6' In fact, one must
58. Id. at 2123-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. This concept of congruence will be discussed in greater depth. See infra Part II.D.
60. Studies, many of which have been done by the Urban Institute, demonstrate the
differential treatment accorded minority and white candidates for the same jobs, houses, etc.
They are compelling and suggest that we do not yet live in an equal or colorblind society.
See e.g., Margery A. Turner, et al., Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished Racial
Discrimination in Hiring IX, URBAN INST. REP. (1991) (overall, white job applicants fared
better in the hiring process than equally qualified black applicants who applied for the same
job); Margery A. Turner, et al., Housing and Urban Development, Housing Discrimination
Study: Synthesis VI (Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. 1991) (more than fifty percent of black
and hispanic subjects seeking to buy or rent a home were treated less favorably than paired
white subjects); Peter J. Leahy, Are Racial Factors Important for the Allocation of Mortgage
Money?, 44 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 185 (1985) (study controlling for socioeconomic factors
between neighborhoods which were similar in all major mortgage-lending criterion except
for race, and finding that mortgage lending outcomes are unequal). Additionally, legal
scholars using social science data to support their conclusions have recognized that our
society is not yet colorblind. See, e.g. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, And Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
61. In her dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice Ginsburg aptly sums up this point with
a quote from Steven L. Carter:
[W]hatever the source of racism, to count it the same as racialism, to say
that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been mostly
about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial
oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under
racism. To pretend ... that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the
issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present
doesn't exist.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2138 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen L. Carter, When
Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 433-34 (1988).
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substantively ignore the history of this nation; an odd approach to
issues that arise precisely because of that history.62 This is the
primary concern raised by the concept of consistency as augmented
by the concept of skepticism.
Of course, that is not to say that the concept of skepticism
standing alone must be used in an ahistorical fashion. As Justice
O'Connor points out in the majority decision, any government
developed race based classification should be viewed skeptically
because of the dangers inherent in treating people differently based
on race.' In fact, the concept of skepticism towards racial classifi-
cations, well established in Supreme Court precedent,' can be
applied consistently not only with strict scrutiny,' but also with
more lenient standards of equal protection review.66 Standing
alone, skepticism is not a concept that necessarily requires benign
62. It is particularly interesting that in his concurrence, Justice Thomas states:
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this
program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses
our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness").
Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement). Thomas's use
of this quote epitomizes the Court's ahistorical approach. The words of the Declaration of
Independence make perfect sense and seem to embrace a certain universality. However, the
same Constitution to which Justice Thomas refers recognized slavery as legal and counted
African-Americans as three fifths of a person. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2(3). Until thirty years
ago the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, permitted the continued existence of
segregation and the separate but equal doctrine. Lofty principles sound wonderful as
universal rules when divorced from their historical contexts. However, placed in that
context, benign race based measures would appear necessary to make the universal
application of those principles a reality.
63. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
64. Id at 2111.
65. See id. (applying the concept of skepticism with strict scrutiny).
66. Skepticism of race-based classifications does not, by itself, mandate strict scrutiny.
One can be skeptical and apply a lower standard, such as intermediate scrutiny, to benign
measures because they are justified both by this nation's sad history of race relations and
Congress' enumerated powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547; Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Skepticism
would be healthy in this context because it would keep courts on guard as they apply the
standard. Skepticism is already embodied in the application of the heightened scrutiny
inherent in the intermediate level standard. In fact, one could turn the Adarand opinion on
its head-instead of using strict scrutiny to determine what measures are benign or invidious
(and watering it down in some contexts) courts could apply rational basis scrutiny with
skepticism to apparently benign measures, thereby requiring a court to ask whether the
legislature's motives were invidious or benign. If benign, rational basis scrutiny would apply;
strict scrutiny would apply if the motivation was invidious.
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measures to be treated in the same fashion as invidious ones.67
Skepticism is by far, the least troubling aspect of the tripartite
conceptual framework proposed by the Adarand Court; at least
until it is plugged into the other two concepts of consistency and
congruence.
A major force underlying the majority approach in Adarand is
the need for clarity in an area of law fraught with confusion.' On
its face, the majority decision would seem to provide this clarity.69
However, Adarand, along with Croson, has created a new kind of
confusion; confusion which has far greater practical implications
than the confusion the Adarand majority sought to clear up. For,
in applying its strict scrutiny standard based on the concepts of
skepticism, consistency and congruence, the Adarand majority does
not address the level of scrutiny to be accorded benign measures
based on gender and disability.7' Similarly, Croson does not deal
with these concerns.
71
Since affirmative action programs often involve gender and
disability in addition to race, the Adarand decision has created
serious anomalies in the tiered equal protection framework.72 The
remainder of this article is devoted to addressing what options the
Court has left us in regard to this situation, which of these options
are appropriate and why. The foregoing discussion of Adarand and
its predecessors provides the background against which this
discussion must take place.
67. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120.
68. Id.; See also id. at 2120-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority glosses
over real differences between benign and invidious measures in an attempt to promote its
concept of "consistency").
69. As Part I and III of this Article point out, however, this "clarity" has come at a high
price. Moreover, the clarity purportedly offered in Adarand might not be any more clear
in application than the previous standards. A large portion of the remainder of this article
is devoted to assessing the new confusion created in the Adarand majority's quest for clarity.
70. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
71. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
72. See infra Part II.
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II. The Practical Legacy Of Adarand And Croson: What To
Do About Gender And Disability In Light Of The "New"
Treatment Of Race
Neither Adarand nor Croson dealt with the appropriate
standard for addressing benign gender or disability based pro-
grams.v3 In those cases, the court applied strict scrutiny to benign
racial classifications because strict scrutiny was applicable to
invidious racial classifications,74 without providing an explanation
as to the impact of those decisions on gender and disability based
classifications subject to lower levels of equal protection scrutiny.
7
Adarand in particular utilized the terms "skepticism" and "consis-
tency.' '76 As noted above, together these two concepts require
that the same level of equal protection scrutiny be applied to all
racial classifications whether benign or invidious.
77
This overall approach creates a problem. Many affirmative
action programs involve race, gender and disability.' Since
invidious classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate
scrutiny,79 and those based on disability are generally subject to
rational basis scrutiny,"° it appears that Adarand has created what
amounts to a tiered approach to affirmative action based on its
73. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Id.
at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. 469; T. Alexander Alienkoff, A Case for
Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1095 n.168 (1991) (recognizing confusion over
gender based classifications following Croson: "[i]f in following Croson, all lines drawn on
the basis of gender will be judged by the same standard, then gender based affirmative action
programs, which have been subjected to mid-level scrutiny, would seemingly be subjected to
a lower level scrutiny than race-based plans. This conundrum cannot go unaddressed").
74. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
75. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on
remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to benign gender classification and rational basis scrutiny to a similar
disability based classification).
76. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
77. See supra Part I.
78. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (reviewing a Philadelphia set aside ordinance
applying to race, gender and disability); GEORGE STEPHANOPOLIS & CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
JR., AFFIRMATIvE ACTION REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 76-80 (July 19, 1995)
(noting that several programs of the Department of Education and Health and Human
Services "are targeted on the basis of race, gender or disability").
79. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001;
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 942
(9th Cir. 1987).
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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reliance on the concept of "consistency."'" Justice Stevens noted
this concern, at least in regard to gender, in his dissent when he
wrote:
[T]he court may find that its new "consistency" approach to
race-based classifications is difficult to square with its insistence
upon rigidly separate categories for discrimination against
different classes of individuals. For example, as the law
currently stands, the Court will apply "intermediate scrutiny" to
cases of invidious gender discrimination and "strict scrutiny" to
cases of invidious race discrimination, while applying the same
standard for benign classifications as invidious ones. If this
remains the law, then today's lecture about "consistency" will
produce the anomalous result that the government can more
easily enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimina-
tion against women than it can enact affirmative action pro-
grams to remedy discrimination against African-Americans-
even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves.
(citation omitted). When a court becomes preoccupied with
abstract standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the alter
of formal consistency.8
2
Courts have already had to grapple with this concern under
Croson,s' and Adarand significantly compounds the problem."
So what options does Adarand leave us to resolve this significant
confusion created by the Court's quest for "consistency"?
This article asserts that Adarand leaves only four possibilities:
(1) subject benign measures based on race, gender and disability to
different standards of equal protection review, thus making it
harder to enact benign race based programs than to enact programs
based on gender and disability;" (2) require that all benign
measures based on any protected classification be subject to strict
81. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
82. Id. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
84. The federal government has created affirmative action programs based on race,
gender and disability. See STEPHANOPOLIS & EDLEY, supra note 78 at 76-80 (noting several
social programs administered by the Departments of Education and Health and Human
Services); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. I-V) (requiring
affirmative action regarding handicapped individuals in federal agencies and those
contracting with federal agencies and departments). Thus, in the wake of Adarand, courts
reviewing programs that involve classifications other than race, gender and disability will
encounter great confusion as to the appropriate applicable standards.
85. See infra Part II.A.
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scrutiny while maintaining the current three tiered scheme for all
other situations, thus making it easier to enact laws which invidi-
ously discriminate based on gender and disability than to enact laws
meant to remedy the effects of discrimination; 6 (3) subject all
classifications based on race, gender and disability to strict scrutiny,
thus requiring that both invidious and benign measures based on
gender and disability be subject to strict scrutiny;' or, (4) overturn
Adarand (and possibly Croson), applying instead a lower level of
scrutiny to those benign measures created to remedy the effects of
discrimination as was done in Metro Broadcasting,88 or undo the
three tiered equal protection scrutiny scheme in regard to benign
measures and adopt some new approach. 9
In the pages that follow each of these options is discussed.
Ultimately I will explain why options three and four provide the
best alternatives. In discussing these options, I will also explain
what I have termed "the vertical anomalies" created by option
one90 and the "horizontal anomaly" created by option two.91  in
reading the discussion that follows, it is important to consider that
"strict scrutiny," as characterized in Adarand,92 is not necessarily
fatal to affirmative action programs.93 I will explore this idea in
greater detail in Part III.
94
A. The First Option: Maintaining the Current Three Tiered
System and the Creation of Vertical Anomalies
The first option left in the wake of Adarand in regard to
gender and disability based affirmative action is to maintain the
integrity of the three tiered equal protection scrutiny system.95
This would result in tiered affirmative action. 96 The concept of
"consistency" as set forth in Adarand would require that both
86. See infra Part II.B.
87. See infra Part II.C.
88. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
89. See infra Part II.D. See also supra note 17 and sources cited therein.
90. See infra Part II.A.
91. See infra Part II.B.
92. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Id. at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2117. See also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Part III.
95. I do not mean to imply that the Adarand decision specifically addressed gender or
disability based affirmative action. It did not. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. However, the
opinion did create an apparent anomaly in regard to affirmative action aimed at helping
classes other than race.
96. See infra Figures 1 and 2 and accompanying text.
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invidious and benign measures be accorded the same treatment
within each tier of the equal protection scheme." This is the
logical result of the "what's good for the goose is good for the
gander" approach spelled out in Adarand.98 However, as has
been suggested in regard to Croson,99 this creates an anomaly."°
This anomaly, which I term a "vertical anomaly" is represented by
Figure 1.
97. Of course, the Adarand majority would likely say that one must apply strict scrutiny
to determine whether a measure is benign or invidious in the first place. Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2113. However, when strict scrutiny is viewed in the tiered system such a requirement
makes no sense. If one "must" subject a measure to strict scrutiny to determine its purpose,
then how can a gender based program ever be properly analyzed within the current tiered
system given the concept of "consistency?" Or would it be adequate to simply accept a
legislature's description of a program as benign under intermediate scrutiny? If so, the
problems addressed infra at notes 100-04, arise. Additionally, if after Adarand, Congress'
stated purpose for legislation (i.e. benign race-based measures) is not to be accepted absent
strict scrutiny, the problem of giving proper deference to Congress' power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment under § 5 of that Amendment arises. See supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text. The additional concern that benign measures will be struck down in the
process of determining whether they are benign unless they meet an extremely high
evidentiary burden also arises. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
98. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. It is possible that "consistency" was meant only to
apply to race. However, this makes little sense in light of how the concept is presented in
Adarand. If the race of those benefitted by a program should not determine the level of
scrutiny, neither should the gender or disability status of those similarly benefitted or
burdened. Otherwise, the vertical anomaly will be even more pronounced. If this were not
the case, then the horizontal anomaly discussed infra Part II.B. might occur.
99. Alienkoff, supra note 73, at 1095 n.168; infra note 170 and accompanying text; see
also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning Adarand causes the
same problem in regard to federal programs).
100. The fact that the Court has created an anomaly or inconsistency does not mean that
the Court will necessarily see fit to remedy the situation. However, as is explained in this
Part, the anomalies created by Adarand when gender and disability based affirmative action
are considered are quite severe, and ultimately it is likely that the Court will be forced to
deal with them.
Additionally, someone siding with the position taken by Justice Scalia in Adarand,
might argue that no anomaly is presented by this situation since government can never have
a compelling reason to discriminate on the basis of race to make up for past discrimination.
Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia J., concurring). Therefore, the fact that gender and disability based
affirmative action are subject to lower standards than race based affirmative action does not
create an anomaly since race based affirmative action is always unacceptable. However, this
is more an argument against affirmative action, or at least against race based affirmative
action, than it is an argument against the existence of vertical anomaly. If as Adarand
specifically states, race based affirmative action is viable in appropriate circumstances, then
the anomalies discussed in this article do exist. Id. at 2117. If not, then the anomaly is even
greater because while there can be no race based affirmative action, there could be
affirmative action for classes which receive less protection from invidious discrimination. See
infra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
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High Burden
f
Race Invidious <----> Benign
(Strict Scrutiny) consistency
Gender Invidious <---> Benign
(Intermediate Scrutiny) consistency
Disability Invidious <---- > Benign











Essentially, this anomaly means that it will be much harder to
enact race-based affirmative action than to enact gender based
affirmative action,'' and harder still to enact race based affirma-
tive action than to enact disability based affirmative action."
While all of these groups have suffered severe discrimination in this
nation,1"3 it seems odd that, under the Equal Protection Clause,
it would be harder to take affirmative action to remedy the effects
of racial discrimination. This is especially troubling considering
that the Equal Protection Clause was initially created as a means
to end discrimination against the slaves,' °" and that affirmative
action was first adopted primarily to help African-Americans.
t °5
Moreover, making the enactment of race based affirmative
action programs the most difficult does not seem to fit well when
one considers the reasons these classifications are situated as they
are within the relevant tiers of scrutiny. Under traditional equal
101. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
102. 102. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (applying the rational basis test to the disability
based portion of a program, while applying strict scrutiny to the race based portion).
103. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (recognizing discrimination based on race); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (recognizing discrimination based on gender);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990) (recognizing discrimination based
on disability).
104. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. The concept of affirmative action first appeared officially in executive orders issued
in the 1960s as part of anti-discrimination measures dealing with race, creed, color and
national origin in the arena of government contracts. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R.
448 (1959-63); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Sept. 24, 1965). Ironically, invidious
discrimination aimed at all of the groups (i.e. race, creed, color and national origin)
mentioned in these early affirmative action attempts currently receives strict scrutiny. Yet,
under Adarand, federal affirmative action aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination
towards these groups continues to be scrutinized the most.
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protection analysis, race is considered a suspect class, and thus
receives the highest level of scrutiny.' 6 Gender, however, is
considered a quasi-suspect class, and thus receives more protection
than most classifications but less than race. This is because gender
can be relevant in some, though very few, circumstances. 1°7
According to the Supreme Court, disability is not a suspect or
quasi-suspect class and thus it receives far less protection under the
Equal Protection Clause."~ Whether or not the status of disabil-
ity as a suspect or quasi-suspect class might change in light of the
passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act,"°9 will be dis-
cussed later in this article.110
Since as among race, gender, and disability, race is the class
entitled to the greatest protection from discrimination, it would
seem logical that measures aimed at remedying the effects of racial
discrimination would be given the greatest latitude. Yet, the
vertical anomaly created by Adarand/Croson makes it harder to
engage in affirmative action to remedy race discrimination, even
though under the Equal Protection Clause, that type of discri-
mination is considered the most pernicious kind.'
Essentially, the Court's concept of "consistency" can work
within a tier. However, when that tier is placed on the road with
the other tiers and with the groups falling within them, it is not
logical that it be a two way street. When dealing with invidious
discrimination the tiers make some sense; race has a unique history
in this nation and is virtually never a relevant factor for legislative
purposes,"2 while disability and gender can be relevant under
some circumstances."3 Thus, there is justification for making it
106. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985). Galotto, supra note 15, at 518-22.
108. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
109. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
110. See infra Part II.C.
111. That racial discrimination is the most pernicious kind of discrimination is inherent
in the history of applying strict scrutiny to invidious racial classifications. Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2106-08. Id at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that it is anomalous to make
it harder to remedy discrimination against African Americans through affirmative action
plans since the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to avoid discrimination
against the former slaves).
112. Id. at 2112-13. See also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
113. For example, consider a statute requiring separate restroom facilities for men and
women or a law requiring that one be able to see in order to drive. See Galotto, supra note
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harder to discriminate on the basis of race. Since however, the
purpose of affirmative action is to help remedy the effects of past
discrimination, it makes no sense to make it harder to enact
programs meant to remedy the effects of racial discrimination than
to enact programs aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination
against classifications which are entitled to less protection in regard
to invidious discrimination." 4 Figure 2 depicts this conundrum:
More Protection From Harder to Enact
Invidious Discrimination Remedial Legislation
Race t Invidious <-................> Benign
(Strict Scrutiny) consistency
Gender Invidious< --------- > Benign
(Intermediate Scrutiny) consistency
Disability Invidious <-.............. > Benign
(Rational Basis Scrutiny) consistency
Less Protection From Easier to Enact
Invidious Discrimination Remedial Legislation
FIGURE 2
After Croson, several courts have had to deal with these
concerns in regard to local government programs. The results are
a mixed bag which demonstrate the effects of vertical anomaly in
action.
In Contractors Association v. City of Philadelphia," the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a Philadelphia program
which established set-asides on the basis of race, gender and
disability."6 The district court had invalidated the ordinance in
regard to all of the classes covered.17 In the light of the decision
in Croson, which required that strict scrutiny be applied to all race-
based programs created by state and local governments," 8 the
court of appeals applied strict scrutiny to the race based aspects of
the program.119
15, at 518 (setting forth the restroom example in the context of a discussion about the
Court's treatment of gender discrimination under the equal protection doctrine).
114. This is likely why Justice Stevens referred to this situation in regard to gender and
race as an anomaly. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1990), on remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91
F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 993.
118. Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
119. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1000.
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Citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,"2 which
had held a gender based classification favoring women to that
standard, the court then applied intermediate scrutiny to the gender
based aspects of the program.12 1 The court also held that based
on Croson it was logical to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications since Croson had applied the same standard to
benign race based programs as to other racial classifications."
The Third Circuit thus implied that the concept of "consistency"
was inherent in Croson and applicable to gender.
Rational basis scrutiny was applied to the disability based
aspects of the program" under the standards set forth in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc"24 The court rejected the
argument that the Americans With Disabilities Act"2 altered
Cleburne. In so ruling, the court cited only to a footnote in More
v. Farrier,"2 a case providing only a cursory explanation as to
why the ADA could not serve as a basis to alter the level of
scrutiny applicable to disability." The court's cursory treatment
of this argument is a bit puzzling in light of Congressional language
contained in the ADA which declares disabled individuals to be a
"discreet and insular minority," and explains that disabled indi-
viduals have been subject to a history of discrimination based on
immutable characteristics.1" These considerations are all relevant
to the determination of suspect classification.
12 1
Ultimately, the Third Circuit in Contractors Association had to
apply three different tests to the same program to assess the
program's constitutionality as it applied to the three different
classes." ° In doing so, the court of appeals found that the district
court had erred in granting summary judgement against the city
with regard to the race and disability aspects of the program, but
120. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
121. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1000-01.
122. 1I at 1001.
123. Id.
124. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
126. Contractor's Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001 (citing More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
127. More, 984 F.2d 269. See also Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001.
128. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1990).
129. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); infra Part II.C.
130. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001.
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that it had correctly dismissed the gender preference.13 ' At the
summary judgement stage, the city of Philadelphia had presented
detailed statistical and anecdotal evidence regarding the race-based
aspects of the program,132 virtually no evidence in regard to the
gender based aspects,133 and simply anecdotal evidence for the
disability based aspects of the program."M
Thus in Contractors Association, the racial preference was
subjected to the greatest scrutiny, and the nature and level of
evidence required was significant.13' By contrast, the disability
preference was barely scrutinized and survived the equal protection
analysis with minimal evidence. 36  Moreover, while the court
struck down the gender preference, it did hold that: "Logically a
city must be able to rely on less evidence in enacting a gender
preference than a racial preference because applying Croson's
evidentiary standard to a gender preference would eviscerate the
difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny."'" Thus,
while the race based portion of the program in Contractors
Association survived summary judgment, it is apparent that the
evidentiary hurdles required to do so are significant and make it
much harder to defend the race based portions of a program than
those based on gender or disability.
In another case, Coral Construction Co. v. King County,1 3
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a challenge to King
County, Washington's minority and womens' business enterprise
set-aside program.1 39 The district court had granted the county's
motion for summary judgement.1"  However, the Court of
Appeals reversed as to the race-based aspects of the program,
holding that strict scrutiny requires detailed statistical proof in
addition to the strong anecdotal evidence that King County had
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1002-08.
133. Id. at 1009-11.
134. Id. at 1011-12. On remand, the district court invalidated the race based aspects of
the program under strict scrutiny analysis. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 893 F.
Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
135. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1009.
136. Id. at 1011-12.
137. Id. at 1010.
138. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 915. See also Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Wash.
1989).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
presented,"" and that the program was not narrowly tailored
because it was geographically overbroad. 42
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit upheld the gender based
preference under intermediate scrutiny,143 noting that "[u]nlike
the strict standard of review applied to race-conscious programs,
intermediate scrutiny does not require any showing of govern-
mental involvement, active or passive, in the discrimination it seeks
to remedy."'" In upholding the gender based preference, the
court relied heavily on the type of anecdotal evidence considered
inadequate to support the race-based set-aside.145
In a third case, Concrete Works of Colorado v. City & County
of Denver,"4 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a
Denver ordinance which provided a preference for minority and
women's businesses.47 The district court had granted Denver's
motion for summary judgement and Concrete Works of Colorado
appealed."4 The Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny to the
race-based aspects of the program and intermediate scrutiny to the
gender-based aspects. 49 However, after completing a detailed
examination of the evidence required by Croson, the court found
that Denver's evidence in support of the program raised issues of
material fact and thus summary judgment should not have been
granted.'o The court acknowledged that Denver had compiled
"substantial evidence" that was "particularized and geographically
targeted."' 51
The Tenth Circuit in Concrete Works did not differentiate its
analysis as between the race and gender aspects of Denver's
141. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 916-22. King County had produced statistical proof
for the district court in the form of two detailed studies. However, the district court did not
consider that evidence in granting summary judgement because it was presented a few days
before the motions were heard. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this evidence
could be sufficient, but further held that the Coral Construction Company should have an
opportunity to refute that statistical evidence because "statistics are not irrefutable, and may
be rebutted." Id. at 921.
142. Id. at 925-26.
143. Id. at 928-33.
144. Id. at 932.
145. Id. at 933.
146. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
147. Id. at 1515-17.
148. Id. at 1515, 1517.
149. Id at 1519.
150. Id. at 1519-30.
151. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1530.
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program;152 the court seemed to require the same evidence in
support of both. Thus, when the evidence was held to be insuffi-
cient, it was held to be insufficient for both the race and gender
aspects of the program.1 13 No explanation exists as to why the
court proceeded in this manner, but given that the court was
primarily concerned with plaintiff's challenge to the accuracy of
Denver's data in light of the strict evidentiary standard set forth in
Croson,15 the court may simply have believed that an appeal
from a grant of summary judgment did not present an appropriate
opportunity to hold such evidence sufficient under either stan-
dard.
1 55
Finally, in Associated General Contractors of California v. City
& County of San Francisco,156 a pre-Croson case, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied intermediate scrutiny and held the
gender-based aspects of a San Francisco ordinance providing
preferences for minority and women owned businesses to be
facially valid. 57 The court then proceeded to strike down the
preference favoring minority owned businesses under a strict
scrutiny standard.15
However, citing Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,59 United States v. Paradise16° and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson School Board,1 61 the court
stated that it was not applying the "old strict scrutiny that was
'strict' in theory but fatal in fact." 62 Instead, the court applied
a form of strict scrutiny that resembles what would become the
Adarand/Croson version of strict scrutiny." Yet, in upholding




155. See id at 1531 (implying that appeal from summary judgement did not provide an
appropriate opportunity).
156. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
157. Id. at 939-42. Some aspects of the program as a whole were struck down as violative
of the city charter. Id at 924-28. It is the aspects of the program that survived examination
of the city charter which were subjected to the equal protection analysis. Id.
158. Id. at 928-39.
159. 159. See 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun
JJ.).
160. 480 U.S. 149 (1987)(plurality opinion).
161. 476 U.S. 267 (1986)( O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 928.
163. Id.
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racial preference, the court acknowledged that intermediate
scrutiny is still more permissive than strict scrutiny.
164
These four cases demonstrate that the application of strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications (whether invidious or benign),
does not result in consistent analysis of affirmative action programs
under the Equal Protection Clause. The vertical anomaly created
by Adarand/Croson is apparent in cases like Contractors Associa-
tion,"6  and Coral Const. Co."6  Even cases like Concrete
Works,167 where the court utilizes different levels of scrutiny for
different classes but continues to analyze the evidence from a strict
scrutiny perspective, are problematic. Concrete Works is especially
troubling because the court provides no rationale for its ap-
proach."6 Furthermore, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged in Contractors Association: "logically, a city must be
able to rely on less evidence in enacting a gender preference than
a racial preference because applying Croson's [and Adarand's]
evidentiary standard to a gender preference would eviscerate the
difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny."' 69
Perhaps the district court in Contractors Association summed
up this vertical anomaly best when it noted that while the tiered
scrutiny works as intended when invidious discrimination is
involved, those same tiers, when applied to affirmative action
create an anomaly which makes it harder to remedy race discrimi-
nation than sex discrimination even though blacks "as a class" have
been subjected to the most "egregious discrimination.' 70  The
164. Id. at 941-42.
165. See supra notes 115-137 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 146-155 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1010.
170. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274, 1302-1303 (E.D. Pa.
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on remand, 893 F. Supp. 419
(E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996). The district court captured the essence of
the vertical anomaly:
[T]he use of intermediate scrutiny to analyze gender-based classifications in
the affirmative action context produces an anomalous result. In the non-
affirmative action context the use of a three-tiered analysis for ordinances
disadvantaging blacks, women or non-suspect classifications creates the result
intended by the Supreme Court-it is most difficult to uphold a classification
disadvantaging blacks, less difficult to uphold a classification disadvantaging
women, and easiest to uphold a classification disadvantaging a non-suspect class.
However, in the affirmative action setting the use of this three-tiered scheme
means that laws disadvantaging whites (MBEs) will be held to a stricter standard
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district court questioned whether this approach was the intended
result of Croson. If it was, the court questioned the logic of that
result.
171
Another option to avoid the vertical anomaly would be to
apply strict scrutiny to all benign measures while leaving the tiers
otherwise intact.172  Several courts have already utilized this
approach when examining programs involving gender and race.'73
This approach, however, creates yet another anomaly.
B. The Second Option: Subjecting All Affirmative Action to
Strict Scrutiny While Maintaining the Current Three Tiered
Scheme for Invidious Discrimination-The Creation of
Horizontal Anomalies
One way to solve the problem of vertical anomaly is to subject
all government created affirmative action programs to the same
level of scrutiny. Under the current scheme developed by the
Adarand/Croson holdings, that level of scrutiny would be strict
scrutiny.174 Under Adarand/Croson race-based affirmative action
than laws disadvantaging men (FBEs). The flip-side of this is that under the
sliding scale analysis, it becomes easier for a state legislature or a city council to
pass an FBE than an MBE, because the former will be held to a lesser standard
of scrutiny by the courts.
This court questions whether this result was intended. The anomaly lies in
the fact that the three-tiered scheme sprung from the judicial determination that,
as a class blacks have been subjected to the most egregious discrimination over
time. (Citation omitted)... The very existence of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution evinces a Congressional intent to
give itself the power to redress past discrimination against blacks. (Footnote
omitted).
However, a look at Supreme Court decisions holding that laws disadvan-
taging blacks and whites should be held to the same strict standard, see Croson,
supra, and that laws disadvantaging women and men should be held to the same
intermediate standard, see Craig v. Boren, supra, may explain or justify this
anomalous result. Perhaps by determining that discrimination against whites and
discrimination against blacks is equally abhorrent and that the criteria of race is
"more suspect" than gender discrimination, the Supreme Court has accepted the
result that it is now more difficult to remedy race discrimination than sex
discrimination. Whether it has or not, this court questions the logic of such a
result.
Id. at 1302-03. Although the case was partially reversed on appeal, the above language was
not questioned on appeal. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990. See also notes 115-37 and
accompanying text.
171. Contractors Ass'n, 735 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
172. See infra Part II.B.
173. Id.
174. See generally, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
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has to be subject to strict scrutiny.75 Thus, in order to get rid of
the vertical anomaly, strict scrutiny would have to apply to the
other groups included in affirmative action programs unless
Adarand/Croson were overturned. 176 However, this option is
problematic since, under the current three tiered scheme, invidious
classifications based on gender and disability are subject to levels
of scrutiny that are lower than strict scrutiny."7 This creates the
"horizontal anomaly" depicted in figure 3.
More Protection From
Invidious Discrimination
Race T Invidious <- > Benign-Race I
(Strict Scrutiny) I consistency Benign-Gender I
I (Race Only) Benign-Disability
Gender I Invidious <---.-....- ..----
(Intermediate Scrutiny) I inconsistency
Disability Invidious <I 




This option, to subject all benign classifications to strict
scrutiny, may seem too illogical for anyone to actually consider
using in equal protection analysis. Essentially this option would
make it easier to perpetrate invidious discrimination based on
gender and disability than to enact benign measures meant to
remedy the effects of discrimination. Since Croson, however, some
courts have done exactly that.
In Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County,78  Conlin v.
Blanchard,79 and American Subcontractors Association v. City of
Atlanta,18 strict scrutiny was applied to both race and gender
based affirmative action programs. However, the courts in these
three cases did not provide any explanation as to why strict scrutiny
175. See generally, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
176. For discussion of the possibility of overturning Adarand and Croson, see infra Part
II.D.
177. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41;
Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001.
178. 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990). It is significant that Cone Corp. held that both
preferences (race and gender) could survive strict scrutiny. Id.
179. 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).
180. 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989).
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was applied to the gender aspects of the programs.' Nor did the
opinions cite any language from Croson which would support
application of strict scrutiny to gender.t '2 Significantly, every
court that has explained its choice of scrutiny levels in this context
has applied levels of scrutiny lower than strict scrutiny to gender or
disability based preferences."s Sometimes, however, those courts
have bemoaned the vertical anomaly thus created.'
The essence of the horizontal anomaly created by exercise of
this option, as demonstrated in the cases that have utilized it, is the
fact that the option fails to address the level of scrutiny to be
applied to invidious discrimination based on gender and disability.
This failure would seem to violate the concept of "consistency" as
set forth in Adarand,t s since consistency requires that the stan-
dard applied not be dependant upon the group benefitted or
burdened by a classification." 6 However, since Adarand specifi-
cally dealt with race, it is possible that "consistency" as defined in
Adarand is limited to race thus supporting this result. Of course,
this explanation still leaves the anomalous result shown in Figure
3-it would be harder to justify the enactment of benign measures
aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination based on gender
or disability than it would be to perpetuate intentional discri-
mination. Such a result makes little sense even in the ahistorical,
decontextualized world of Adarand.1' Thus, in solving the
vertical anomaly, this option creates a horizontal anomaly; a result
which is unacceptable based on the concept of "consistency" and
on simple logic.
C. The Third Option: Strict Scrutiny for Benign and Invidious
Classifications
One way to solve both the vertical and horizontal anomalies
examined above is to subject all classes traditionally included in
government developed affirmative action programs to strict
scrutiny, both for invidious and benign classifications. This option,
181. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001.
182. Id.
183. See supra Part II.A. and cases cited therein.
184. Contractors Ass'n, 735 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
185. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. This concept was also inherent in the Croson holding.
See generally Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
186. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
187. See supra notes 5 and 61-62 and accompanying text.
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however, is similarly fraught with difficulty. Fortunately, as will be
explained in this Part,"s the Adarand Court might actually have
provided the solution to those difficulties, albeit unintentionally.
Exercise of this option leads to the result depicted in Figure 4 as
discussed in this Part.
More Flexible Strict Scrutiny
Invidious <- ----- > Benign
(Race, Gender, Disability) consistency (Race, Gender, Disability)
FIGURE 4
The primary concern raised by this option is based on the
recognition that gender and disability, two of the three groups
commonly included in affirmative action programs, are not consid-
ered suspect classes for purposes of strict scrutiny analysis." 9
Gender is a quasi-suspect class,' 90 and disability is a non-suspect
class.191 Under current jurisprudence, only classifications based
on race, alienage and national origin are considered "suspect" and
are thus subject to strict scrutiny. 92
The other concern raised by this option is the possibility that
the floodgates to heightened scrutiny could be opened. This would
depend, in part, on how affirmative action is defined under this
option. For example, many social services programs could arguably
be considered a form of affirmative action for certain classes like
children or the poor. Would application of this third option subject
188. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
189. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001.
190. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying a heightened scrutiny to a gender
classification).
191. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001.
192. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
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the classifications created in social service programs to strict
scrutiny?193 Both of these concerns will be addressed below.
I wish to be clear at the outset that this discussion is not meant
to resolve or provide an in-depth examination of the issues raised
by applying strict scrutiny to gender and disability. Scholars and
judges have spent much time debating these complex issues; an in-
depth analysis is thus beyond the scope of this article as is any
speculation on whether the current Court would adopt this option.
The discussion presented in this article focuses instead on the way
in which Adarand's vision of strict scrutiny may have added a new
perspective to this debate, and may have provided the current
Court, or some future one, a means with which to implement this
option. As this Part explains, in light of Adarand, application of
this option is supportable and would provide greater consistency.
The answer to the first concern set forth above may actually
lie in the way in which Adarand and Croson define strict scrutiny.
A major factor preventing gender and disability from being
considered "suspect classes" (thus subjecting measures which
discriminate based on those classifications to strict scrutiny) is the
fact that in some circumstances gender and disability are relevant
considerations.194 This reality was highly problematic in the
193. Another possible concern with characterizing gender and disability as suspect classes
is that the concept of equal protection was primarily developed in relation to the oppression
of African-Americans. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Galotto, supra
note 15, at 536. In Croson, however, the Court ignored the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, holding that it afforded the same protection to whites as to blacks.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469. Thus, the court seemed to be moving towards "a broader notion of
the Equal Protection Clause as an egalitarian principle." See Galatto, supra note 15, at 536
(concluding that this "broadening of equal protection to include whites, however, unwittingly
includes gender groups"). Applying Adarand's concept of "congruence," Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2111, the same would apparently apply to the equal protection aspects inherent in the
Fifth Amendment. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. See also, supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text.
Of course, the simple fact that the Court applies equal protection principles to groups
other than African-Americans, albeit with a lower level of scrutiny, also demonstrates this,
as does the application of strict scrutiny to alienage and national origin.
194. See supra notes 107, 112-13 and accompanying text. Ironically, in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), a plurality of the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a gender classification, noting that what makes gender (as opposed to
characteristics like intelligence or physical disability) more similar to suspect classifications,
is that gender is so rarely relevant to the ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. at
686-87. Ultimately, however, Frontiero would not govern treatment of gender classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps because of a fear that women would be drafted
or that single sex bathrooms and locker rooms would be imposed, the relevant differences
between the sexes precluded the universal application of strict scrutiny, which at the time was
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context of applying strict scrutiny, when that level of scrutiny was
considered "fatal in fact."' 95  However, under the
Adarand/Croson vision of strict scrutiny,196 which appears more
flexible than earlier conceptions of that standard,"9 such dif-
ferences can simply be considered relevant factors in analyzing
gender and disability based classifications under strict scrutiny."8
In fact, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Adarand majority,
specifically states in response to Justice Stevens:
He [Justice Stevens] also allows that nothing is inherently wrong
with applying a single standard to fundamentally different
situations, as long as that standard takes relevant differences
into account. ... What he fails to recognize is that strict
scrutiny does take "relevant differences" into account-indeed,
that is its fundamental purpose."9
Of course, the relevance of the characteristic/classification to
legislative decision making is not the only factor which the
Supreme Court has utilized to define which groups should be
considered "suspect" for equal protection purposes. Other factors
important to such a determination are whether the classification is
based on an "immutable characteristic," or a highly visible trait;
whether the classification has been a basis for historical oppression;
and whether the classified group is a discrete and insular minority
in regard to political representation."
Gender is undoubtedly an immutable characteristic. One is
born with and cannot change one's gender without undergoing
major surgery. Gender is also highly visible; one can generally tell
immediately the gender of an individual upon seeing her or him
"fatal in fact." Galotto, supra note 15, at 521-22. Thus, the intermediate scrutiny standard
essentially embodies the reality that gender may sometimes be relevant. Id. See also City
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. The fact that Frontiero draws a distinction between gender
and disability is not problematic to the argument favoring the application of heightened
scrutiny to disability, in light of the change in perception and legislative treatment regarding
disability since the early 1970s. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
195. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). See also Gerald
Cunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1972).
196. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-11.
197. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-11.
198. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
199. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (citations omitted).
200. Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (plurality opinion); See also Galotto, supra note 15, at 519-21.
The term "discrete and insular minority," was coined in the famous footnote 4 from United
States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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and can often determine gender from voice alone. The latter two
factors (i.e. basis of historical oppression and discrete and insular
minority) are arguably more problematic in the context of classify-
ing gender. Yet, even after the Court repudiated its decision to
apply strict scrutiny to gender in Frontiero v. Richardson, 1 a case
where the Court also held that women have been subject to
historical oppression in this nation and are a "discrete and insular
minority,"'  many courts have continued to acknowledge the
serious discrimination that women face in society while applying
the intermediate scrutiny standard.'
Likewise, disability is an immutable characteristic. One
generally cannot change the fact that he or she is disabled absent
some sort of cure or significant treatment. If the disabled indi-
vidual were cured, or the disabling effects of the condition totally
alleviated through treatment, then the individual would no longer
be disabled and would not be entitled to receive the same level of
scrutiny. Additionally, disability is frequently highly visible. Of
course, this is not always the case; it may be impossible to deter-
mine visually whether someone has a particular disability such as
epilepsy or cancer. However, since characteristics such as alienage
and national origin which are not always highly visible are afforded
strict scrutiny,' the visibility factor alone is apparently not
dispositive on the issue of equal protection classification.
As with gender, it is the last two factors (i.e. basis of historical
oppression and discrete and insular minority) that are most
problematic in the context of classifying disability. In City of
Cleburne,' the Court rejected arguments that the mentally
retarded have been subject to a history of oppression or relegated
to a position of political powerlessness sufficient to meet these two
factors.' Since City of Cleburne, however, Congress passed the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA").' Among the
201. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
202. Id. at 684-87.
203. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 939-42.
204. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classification based on alienage); City
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (classifications based on race, alienage or national origin receive
strict scrutiny).
205. 473 U.S. at 432.
206. Id. at 442-47.
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
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Congressional findings incorporated into the ADA are the following:
(2) [H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities continue to be serious and pervasive social
problems; ...
(6) [C]ensus data, national polls, and other studies have
documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an
inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;...
(7) [I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful and unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to partici-
pate in, and contribute to, society; ... 20
The language that Congress utilized in the ADA is virtually
identical to the language typically associated with suspect classifica-
tions.2°' Such treatment of a class by Congress, although not
dispositive, is certainly relevant to the status of the class within the
tiered equal protection analytical framework.21° The few cases
which have held that the ADA does not alter the standard set forth
in City of Cleburne have done so with only a cursory explanation
and without analyzing the rather clear language of the statute.21'
Additionally, the form of strict scrutiny espoused in Adarand
and Croson lends itself better to analysis of a broad class of
individuals since that standard takes relevant differences into
account.212 For example, a law requiring that individuals be able
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2),(6) and (7) (emphasis added).
209. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 440-47; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
210. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687-88 (concluding, based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
that "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently
invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of government is not without significance
."); Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
211. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001; More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n.4 (8th Cir.
1993).
212. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
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to see in order to obtain a driver's license is likely to survive this
kind of strict scrutiny.213
Disability itself is a diverse and broad characteristic, and an in
depth analysis of how best to analyze disability under strict scrutiny
is beyond the scope of this article. However, since strict scrutiny
now considers relevant differences, and can supposedly weed out
valid from invalid legislative purposes,214 this view of strict
scrutiny can itself accommodate some of the technical problems
resulting from its application to disability.
Thus, a primary factor preventing gender and disability from
being considered "suspect" for strict scrutiny purposes is that those
classifications are relevant more frequently than race (although in
regard to gender, this is rarely so). Justice O'Connor's version of
strict scrutiny in Adarand seems to vitiate this concern since its
very purpose "is to account for relevant differences." '215 This does
not mean that the Court will necessarily find gender and disability
to be discrete and insular minorities subject to a history of
oppression, but it does suggest that recent developments could
support such a holding.
The second concern regarding the application of strict scrutiny
to gender and disability, that this could open the floodgates to
increased use of strict scrutiny, is essentially solved by the above
analysis. 216 Those classifications involve immutable characteristics
and possess the other traits (i.e. basis of historical oppression and
discrete and insular minority) which support suspect classification.
Most other classes do not.217
Since, opting not to apply strict scrutiny to invidious and
benign gender and disability based measures creates horizontal or
vertical anomalies and potentially threatens the Court's vision of
213. However, a similar law based on the race of an applicant for a driver's license could
never be upheld under the strict scrutiny espoused in Adarand. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
214. Id. at 2113.
215. Id.
216. In fact, this fear was one of the primary concerns in the City of Cleburne decision.
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
217. For example, one might say that the elderly are not a discrete and insular minority
who as a group have faced a history of oppression. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that the elderly are not a suspect class).
Of course, if appropriate evidence could support the application of strict scrutiny to the
elderly, or any other group, perhaps the Court would apply strict scrutiny to such a group.
However, few group classifications are likely to garner the level of evidence which supports
the application of strict scrutiny to gender and disability.
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"consistency," application of Adarand's more forgiving formulation
of strict scrutiny is the best solution short of overturning Adarand
and potentially Croson. Thus while this third option as discussed
in this Part is not the only remaining option,218 it is a consistent
and supportable approach to analyzing affirmative action programs
under the Equal Protection Clause.
D. The Fourth Option: Overturning Adarand, Perhaps the Best
Option of All?
The fourth and final option is to overturn Adarand. Since
Adarand's approach is at the core of the anomalies discussed
above,219 exercise of this option could also prevent both the
vertical and horizontal anomalies. Significantly, Adarand itself
provides the rope with which it can be hung.
As was pointed out earlier in this article, the three concepts
underlying the Adarand decision are problematic.2' Skepticism
by itself is not inconsistent with a lower level of scrutiny, but it is
problematic when combined with the other two concepts of
consistency and congruence. "Consistency" creates major inconsis-
tencies when classifications other than race are considered.221
Furthermore, the concept of consistency requires an ahistorical,
decontextualized approach to issues arising specifically in and from
a historical and social context.2' Ironically, it is the third con-
cept, congruence, which can act as a key to overturning the
Adarand decision itself.
Interestingly, the Adarand court engaged in a detailed analysis
of the principle of stare decisis in order to conclude that it was
appropriate to overturn Metro Broadcasting.2' The Court essen-
tially held that Metro Broadcasting was an aberration which signi-
ficantly departed from an "intrinsically sounder" doctrine as
established in prior cases.224 Citing Justice Frankfurter's discus-
sion of stare decisis in Helvering v. Hallock,' the Court deter-
218. See infra Parts II.A.; II.B. and II.D.
219. See supra Parts II.A. and II.B.
220. See supra Part I.
221. See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
222. See supra Part I.
223. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17.
224. Id. at 2114-15.
225. 309 U.S. 106 (1940). The Court refers to Justice Frankfurter's admonition regarding
stare decisis set forth in Helvering. Id. Justice Frankfurter declared that stare decisis
involves more than simply adhering to the most recent decision when such adherence goes
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mined that Metro Broadcasting departed from the three principles
underlying Adarand. In so ruling, the Court explained that those
principles had been consistently applied for over fifty years.'
However, as was previously explained,'m the Adarand
Court's concept of "congruence" was itself a significant departure
from established precedent.' Metro Broadcasting, Croson,
Fullilove and a long line of cases prior to Adarand had established
that there is an inherent difference between Congress' power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the states' role as bound
by that Amendment. 9  Justice Stevens, in his Adarand dissent,
summarizes the Majority's departure:
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the
same time it expressly limits the states. This is no accident. It
represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experi-
ence throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the
Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial
minorities against the states, some of which may be inclined to
oppress such minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ignores
a purposeful "incongruity" so fundamental to our system of
government is unacceptable.
Similarly, Adarand's application of strict scrutiny and use of
the "consistency" concept are themselves inconsistent with the only
precedent to deal with federal affirmative action programs, Metro
Broadcasting and Fullilove. Neither of those decisions applied strict
scrutiny to such programs, nor did they hold that such scrutiny was
appropriate in the affirmative action context even though strict
scrutiny was applicable when invidious discrimination was aimed at
the same racial minorities who were benefitted by the pro-
grams. 1  Significantly, without the concept of "congruence,"
cases such as Croson and Wygant which involved local government
affirmative action programs, would be inapposite since Congress
against a "prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-15 (citing Helvering, 309 U.S. at 119).
226. Id.
227. See supra Part I.
228. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's interpretation of
Fullilove, upon which the Adarand court relies so heavily, implies that strict scrutiny is
appropriate. Five other Justices, however, did not so hold. See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
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has broader powers than local governments to enact such pro-
grams.
232
It is Adarand, not Metro Broadcasting, which represents the
significant departure from precedent; a departure which creates
anomalies that could wreak havoc on the tiered equal protection
system that Adarand purported to apply. Thus, Adarand can be
overturned based on the very reasoning that it used to justify its
own treatment of Metro Broadcasting.23
Of course, the question would still remain; what to do then?
Essentially two possibilities arise. Either go back to the equal
protection doctrine as it stood prior to Adarand (i.e apply the
standard used in Metro Broadcasting), or, alternatively, apply a
different standard to affirmative action; one that may operate
outside the traditional three tiered system. Although I do not
discuss these options in detail, I would like to provide a few
observations about their feasibility based on the foregoing discus-
sion of Adarand.
First, since Metro Broadcasting applied a form of intermediate
scrutiny to race based affirmative action,' even if Metro Broad-
casting were to be the law, a vertical anomaly between race and
gender on the one hand, and disability on the other would still
exist. However, such an anomaly would not be as severe as that
created by application of the Adarand approach.235 Moreover,
the same factors that militate in favor of applying strict scrutiny to
disability based classifications could support the application of
intermediate scrutiny to such classifications.26  The findings of
social and economic disadvantage in regard to disabled individuals
as set forth in the ADA support the argument that subjecting
disability based affirmative action to a lower level of scrutiny is
desirable.27
232. See supra Part I.
233. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17.
234. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part II.C.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001. However, this approach could
create a horizontal anomaly if a higher level of scrutiny were applied to invidious
discrimination based on disability. Significantly, however, such horizontal anomaly seems
acceptable under Metro Broadcasting, which itself allowed for a similar anomaly in regard
to race. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547. Such an anomaly makes more sense in the
Metro Broadcasting context because it would make it easier to remedy discrimination than
it does to discriminate in the first place.
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Second, it has been suggested that true tiers in equal protec-
tion analysis really do not exist, and that what the Court really does
is apply variations of the same standard.2" For example, Justice
Stevens has implied that a flexible standard of review, grounded in
rationality, that calls for heightened evidentiary burdens depending
on the classification involved could provide a realistic and workable
approach. 9 The primary advantage to this type of approach in
the affirmative action context is that it is contextual and acknowl-
edges history.
This type of approach could be effectuated through a "rational
basis with teeth" approach. In other words, a rational basis
approach which requires a more detailed examination of evidence
and context. It would be logical to place affirmative action
programs in the rational basis tier since doing so would eradicate
all vertical anomalies in regard to affirmative action, and the
resulting horizontal anomalies make more sense in the affirmative
action context. Additionally, application of the rational basis test
need not lead to predetermined results. As Justice O'Connor has
acknowledged, even the rigid strict scrutiny test can be flexible.'l
Moreover, at least two Justices in Fullilove applied a test that
did not utilize the traditional concept of a tiered equal protection
doctrine." I Thus, it would not be too great a leap to develop a
test which would enable courts to analyze government developed
affirmative action programs consistently with equal protection
without getting caught in the anomalous morass which is created
when courts attempt to apply the three tiered scheme. Since the
Court has consistently struggled to reach a consensus that would
have a lasting effect under the three tiered equal protection
scheme,242 developing a new test could be an excellent option.
Finally, even if Adarand were overturned, Croson would
remain. Like Adarand, Croson creates the same anomalies, only
238. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (seemingly applying a heightened form of
rational basis review).
240. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111, 2117.
241. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
242. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109 (noting that for over eight years, the Court was unable
to produce a majority on the issue of race-based remedial government action in Bakke,
Fullilove, and Wygant). How long the Adarand/Croson doctrine will survive is still an open
question. As this article demonstrates, the problems which arise under the Adarand
approach could ultimately prompt a later Court to discard or reformulate the
Adarand/Croson doctrine.
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in regard to state and local affirmative action programs. Adarand
is most susceptible to being overruled based on its reading of the
"congruence" concept;' Croson however, would likely survive
such action. Yet, since Croson creates the same anomalies as
Adarand and is subject to some of the same infirmities,2' Croson
should also be overruled.245 Suffice it to say that if Croson is left
untouched, courts would be limited to exercising the other options
outlined above as they struggle to address similar anomalies in
regard to state and local affirmative action programs.'
III. Strict Scrutiny As Applied To Affirmative Action Is Not
Fatal In Fact Under Adarand/Croson
All of the options set forth in Part II, with the exception of the
option to overrule Adarand, would require strict scrutiny be applied
at least to race-based affirmative action.247 Significantly, this does
not mean that affirmative action programs cannot survive that level
of scrutiny. Adarand specifically dispelled the notion that strict
scrutiny is "strict in theory but fatal in fact,"2' although it would
appear that strict scrutiny is indeed "fatal in fact" for most
invidious classifications.249
Essentially, these options shift the focus from the level of
scrutiny to the level of evidence required to support a benign
program. This is exactly what Croson did in regard to state and
local affirmative action programs." ° Evidence of broad societal
discrimination is no longer sufficient."' Evidence of discrimina-
243. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
244. Most significantly, the "what's good for the goose, is good for the gander" approach
(labeled "consistency" in Adarand) leads to vertical anomaly. See infra Part II.A.
245. Exactly how or why Croson should be overruled is beyond the scope of this article.
For an excellent discussion of why Croson is a problematic opinion that ultimately should
not survive, see Rosenfeld, supra note 5; See also Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited." A Legacy
of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 679 (1995)
(pointing out inherent weaknesses in the Croson decision and some of the problems applying
Croson).
246. See supra Parts II.A., II.B. and II.C. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would have to
address the constitutionality of option three, if it was adopted.
247. See supra Part II.A. (strict scrutiny would apply to race); Part II.B. (strict scrutiny
would apply to all benign measures based on race, gender or disability) and Part II.C. (strict
scrutiny would apply to all classifications based on race, gender or disability).
248. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
249. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that she reads the opinions in
Adarand to mean a Korematsu-type invidious classification will never again survive scrutiny).
250. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
251. Id. at 486-93.
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tion by the governmental entity involved, whether active or passive,
is apparently required.? 2
Significantly, after Croson, several federal appellate courts
have held that programs could survive strict scrutiny. 3  While
most of these cases were appealed after a grant of summary
judgement, and thus only held that an issue of material fact existed
as to the validity of the programs involved,' each of these courts
acknowledged that sufficient evidence could be present in those
cases,255 and at least one court was quite specific about the type
of evidence required to meet strict scrutiny.26 The key is that the
Adarand Court, like the Court in Croson, specifically acknowledged
that some benign measures could survive strict scrutiny.2
57
Therefore, Congress and state legislatures alike can craft
benign race, gender and disability based measures which are
constitutional as long as these programs are supported by appro-
priate data. Unfortunately, like Croson, the Adarand decision is
not very clear about what type of evidence is required to meet this
test.' Perhaps the best guidance for courts grappling with this
evidentiary morass will come from cases like Concrete Works29
and Contractors Association21 which seek to interpret the eviden-
tiary burdens set forth in Croson. Significantly, these cases
252. Id. at 493. Whether this will ultimately be required for Congressional action was not
clearly addressed in Adarand. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
253. See generally Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990; Coral Const. Co., 941 F.2d 910; Cone
Corp., 908 F.2d 908. Ultimately, however, at least in Contractors As'n, the program was
struck down. See Contractors Ass'n, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d
Cir. 1996).
254. Contractor's Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1012; Coral Const Co., 941 F.2d at 933; Cone Corp.,
908 F.2d at 917.
255. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1010-11; Coral Const. Co., 941 F.2d at 930-33; Cone
Corp., 908 F.2d at 912-17.
256. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001-09. Though, as noted supra at note 253, on
remand it was determined the race based aspects of the program in question did not meet
this level of scrutiny. See also Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1519-30 (also giving a detailed
analysis of the nature of evidence required to meet strict scrutiny after Croson).
257. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113-14, 2117. See also Kathryn Lee, Note, Surviving Strict
Scrutiny: Upholding Federal Affirmative Action After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
44 BuFF. L. REV. 929 (1996) (discussing why federal affirmative action programs can survive
strict scrutiny as spelled out in Adarand).
258. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117-18; See also Duncan, supra note 246 (noting the
uncertainty as to the exact evidentiary standards required to meet the strict scrutiny test set
forth in Croson).
259. 36 F.3d 1513.
260. 6 F.3d 990.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
acknowledge that programs can survive strict scrutiny if they are
supported by proper evidence. 61
Moreover, the necessary evidence can be post-enactment
evidence; even if such evidence was not in existence when a
program was initiated, a government entity can still utilize it to
support the program against constitutional challenge. 6 Thus,
even if evidence adequate to meet the evidentiary burden associa-
ted with strict scrutiny was not utilized when creating the federal
programs, these programs need not be repealed in light of Adarand
so long as the government can produce such evidence in response
to a constitutional challenge. Of course, use of post-enactment
evidence might become less acceptable as the passage of time gives
the government an opportunity to respond to Adarand and Croson.
Given the great deal of evidence that discrimination is socially
embedded in our nation,' it is unfortunate that the Court has
required such a costly evidentiary burden. Still, while compiling
the studies and statistical analysis apparently required by
Croson/Adarand will be costly, the burden can be met.2' What
is less clear after Adarand is how the fact that Congress, unlike
local legislatures, is not geographically limited in its ability to pass
legislation in this country will play into the nature of the evidence
required to support a federal program. Nor is it clear what role
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment
might play in assessing, under the strict scrutiny standard, the
validity of any remedial measures that it passes. It is possible that
the Court envisions a scenario where Congress has more latitude
in regard to aspects of the evidentiary burden linked to strict
scrutiny.' Unfortunately, the Adarand Court is not very clear
on this issue."6
Two statements from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand,
however, demonstrate that government developed affirmative
action is not yet dead:
261. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; See also Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990.
262. See generally Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990.
263. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 60; Lawrence supra note 60. See also, supra note
60 and accompanying text.
264. See generally Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513.
265. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
266. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. This is another problem created by the Court's concept
of congruence-i.e. exactly how much congruity is required? Furthermore, does not any
difference in the level of congruence vitiate the entire concept as spelled out by the Court?
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." (Citation omitted). The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it;267 [and,]
When race-based action is necessary to further a compel-
ling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this court has set out in
previous cases.
261
Thus, if option three as proposed in this article (i.e. strict
scrutiny for benign and invidious classifications) were utilized,'
it is possible that gender and disability would receive strict scrutiny
along with race, but that benign measures based on all of those
classifications could survive constitutional scrutiny. Regardless of
which option is ultimately chosen, strict scrutiny as applied to
benign measures is no longer "fatal in fact."' 0
IV. Conclusion
The Adarand decision, like Croson before it, created a great
deal of confusion in its quest for consistency. While some of that
confusion is tied to inconsistencies within the decision itself, and to
the lack of clear guidance regarding the evidence required to
survive the now survivable strict scrutiny test, the greatest confu-
sion is likely to arise from the chaotic anomalies which now exist
within the tiered equal protection system when affirmative action
programs based on gender and disability are added to the mix.
These anomalies, combined with the lack of a clear evidentiary
standard for analyzing affirmative action under strict scrutiny will
likely lead to a confusion that will dwarf the confusion created by
earlier decisions in this area. Whether the court intended this
result is unclear. What is clear, however, is that courts dealing with
the plethora of affirmative action programs based on race, gender
and disability, legislatures attempting to enact measures that deal
with the effects of discrimination in our society, and the individuals
267. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
268. Id.
269. See supra Part II.C (strict scrutiny would apply to all classifications based on race,
gender or disability).
270. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
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affected by that discrimination will be left to clean up and pay the
price for the mess.
